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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine this scenario . . . February 19, 2013, 2300 hours local time,
in the mountains of Afghanistan.  A known terrorist leader is meeting
with two of his lieutenants in a small hut, in a small mountain village.
Without warning, the room in which he is sitting explodes, killing the
three terrorists instantly.  Also killed are the woman and two children
in the neighboring house.  What none of these victims knew was that
for weeks, a number of Americans had been watching them and plan-
ning the missile strike from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).  What
makes this fictional strike legally interesting, and is the focus of this
Article, is the involvement of civilians in the strike.
A lethal strike, such as the one described above, may very well in-
volve civilians during all phases of the operation.  For instance, the
UAV may have launched from an airstrip in Afghanistan where a civil-
ian contractor serviced the airstrip.  Prior to the launch, the military
commander that authorized the strike may have received advice from
an intelligence officer, who in turn received expert analysis from a ci-
vilian contractor.  A myriad of other civilians may have supported the
military members at their base, ranging from the third country na-
tionals that run the laundry and dining facilities, to the Department
of Defense (DoD) civilian employees that provide morale, welfare, and
recreation (MWR) services such as internet cafes and movie theaters.
Change the location of the strike to Pakistan or other Middle Eastern
countries and civilian employees of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) very well could have approved and executed the mission.  Each
of these civilians, in their own way, is supporting a U.S. combat mis-
sion, but their activities do not have the same legal importance.  This
Article will examine some of the issues raised by this scenario.
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Since 9/11, America has been engaged in the so-called War on Ter-
ror.1  While some in academia debate whether the conflict against al-
Qaeda and associated groups is in fact a “war,” the fact remains that
the United States has been and continues to be actively involved in
combat or combat-like activities around the world aimed at stopping
or minimizing the ability of terrorists to attack the United States or
its allies.  In many, if not most, instances of the United States’ appli-
cation of combat power, civilians are present and actively involved in
the process.  At the same time, the United States continues to grapple
with the question of the legal status of our enemy and the legal justifi-
cation for our use of force, including questions about who applies the
force, where, and under what circumstances.
A full analysis of the legal bases for the use of force in the War on
Terror is beyond the scope of this Article.  Instead, this Article will
describe the modern usage of civilians by the United States in its pros-
ecution of the War on Terror and will seek to analyze the actors’ status
in terms of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC),2 including the implica-
tions for U.S. policy regarding the targeting and capture and trial of
members and supporters of al-Qaeda.  Part II will describe the modern
trend of using civilians to employ armed force, including the use of
CIA operatives to employ UAV-launched missiles to engage terrorists.
Part III will discuss and apply the various legal principles found in the
LOAC to the facts as described.  Part IV will then analyze and discuss
the implications of U.S. policy and action and will describe various
alternative proposals that may help clarify the legal issues at stake.
By using civilians not only to support combat troops on the battle-
field, but also to directly engage the enemy by way of covert activities,
such as drone strikes, the United States runs the risk of weakening
the firm LOAC barrier between combatant and civilian that seeks to
protect civilians from harm.  Such use of civilians also runs the risk of
undermining the United States’ credibility when characterizing the il-
legality of the actions of our terrorist enemy.  This Article will seek to
address two key aspects of this problem: first, whether the use of civil-
ians by the United States violates the LOAC, and second, whether
such use undermines the legal theory upon which the United States
1. While the phrase “War on Terror” may no longer be used by the U.S. Government
to describe the recent conflict in Iraq and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, this
author uses it as a general descriptive phrase to refer to Operation Iraqi Free-
dom, Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), as well as the drone strikes,
which have taken place in locations such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.
2. The title “International Humanitarian Law” (IHL) is often used to describe the
body of law governing when a State may go to war (jus ad bellum) and how it may
conduct itself in war (jus in bello).  “Law of Armed Conflict” is also frequently
used interchangeably to describe this body of international law.  Because this au-
thor believes “Law of Armed Conflict” more accurately describes the true nature
of war, that phrase will be used throughout.
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bases its targeting and prosecution of al-Qaeda and associated
terrorists.
This Article will conclude that U.S. civilian actions are not per se
LOAC violations (“war crimes”), but will further conclude that, based
on the types of activities undertaken by civilians, and based on the
current Military Commissions Act (MCA)-based prosecutions of ter-
rorists, the use of some U.S. civilians on or in support of the battlefield
undermines the U.S. position vis-a`-vis terrorists.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Civilianization
During this author’s deployment to Iraq in 2009 at a division-level
headquarters, numerous types of actors were personally observed.
These included active and reserve component military members, DoD
civilians, civilian contractors, third country national (TCN) civilians,
and civilian employees of other U.S. agencies and departments.  The
use of civilians on or near the battlefield is not unique to the recent
conflict in Iraq or the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.  Indeed, civil-
ians have performed tasks with or for the U.S. military in every major
conflict since the Revolutionary War.3  While to some degree the
privatization of military or military-related functions has been cycli-
cal,4 since the early 1990s the use of civilians in support of America’s
military objectives has increased dramatically.
Many attribute the increased use of civilians in military operations
with the end of the Cold War.5  Professor Sullivan, for instance, notes
that the end of the Cold War caused a “public eagerness for a ‘peace
dividend’ [and] sparked a dramatic troop drawdown in the West.”6  In
response to the demand for a “peace dividend,” Congress mandated
that the DoD convert 10,000 uniformed billets into civilian positions
by the end of Fiscal Year 1997.7
3. See, e.g., Lt. Col. Thea Harvell III, Department of the Army Civilians in Support
of Military Operations: How Should Current Policies Change to Better Support
Them on Today’s Battlefield?, 1–2 (unpublished U.S. Army War College Mar. 18,
2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432749.  The
author describes how civilians were used to support the U.S. Army during the
Revolutionary War, the Civil War, both World Wars, and virtually every major
armed conflict before and since.
4. Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135,
144–45 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Scott M. Sullivan, Private Force/Public Goods, 42 CONN. L. REV. 853
(2010).
6. Id. at 880–81.
7. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106,
§ 1032, 110 Stat. 186, 429.
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This reduction in active-duty troops did not necessarily equate to a
reduction in workload, however.  As the United States found itself in-
volved in various “peacekeeping” and other humanitarian operations
throughout the 1990s, there was an urgent need to perform roles once
occupied by a much larger active-duty military force.  During the
1990s, the United States reduced its armed forces by 35%.  On Novem-
ber 9, 1989, at the time that the Berlin Wall fell, the U.S. military had
2.1 million active-duty members.8  By September 11, 2001, however,
there were only 1.4 million members in the U.S. armed forces.9
A second reason for the increased reliance on civilians was the use
of advanced technology by the military.10  Some argue that the use of
advanced technology by the military has outpaced the military’s abil-
ity to train operators and maintenance personnel, thus creating a
need to use contractors to maintain and operate certain types of equip-
ment.11  For instance, contractors maintain, among other things, the
F-117 stealth aircraft, the M1-A1 main battle tank, the Patriot missile
defense system, the Apache helicopter, and all types of UAVs.12
Thirdly, some argue that the United States prefers privatization of
many former military functions because it leads to reduced accounta-
bility, both because actions can be attributable to a corporation, even
if contracted by the U.S. Government, and because certain records
may not be as readily accessible through the Freedom of Information
Act.13
Regardless of the reasons, the privatization of military-related
functions enables the United States to maintain a relatively small ac-
tive-duty component, while maintaining the capability of projecting
power and deploying significant combat force.  By using contractor
support, the force is “scalable” in the sense that contracts can be made
for deployments, and then cancelled during peace, all while maintain-
ing a smaller military footprint.14  Civilianization also provides fiscal
benefits through a decrease in the number of active-duty pensions and
benefits paid out and a political dividend because a force could deploy
8. Col. W. Hays Parks, USMC (Ret.), Former Senior Associate Deputy General
Counsel in the International Affairs Division of the DoD’s Office of General Coun-
sel, Address at the NYU Panel at the Tikvah Center for Law and Jewish Civiliza-
tion and the Institute for International Law and Justice: Privatization of War:
the Role of Civilians (Mar. 8–10, 2010) (transcript available at www.nyutikvah.
org/events/docs/papers/Parks_Privatization_of_War.pdf.) [hereinafter Parks’
Address].
9. Id.
10. Sullivan, supra note 5, at 881.
11. See, e.g., Eric Christensen, The Dilemma of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 19
J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 281, 295 (2010).
12. J. Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of Civilians Accompa-
nying the Armed Forces, 57 A.F. L. REV. 155, 190 (2005).
13. Dickinson, supra note 4, at 191–92.
14. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 885.
464 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:459
to a conflict zone and expect relatively fewer troops to return home in
flag-draped caskets.15
The United States now routinely relies on civilians and contractors
to guard prisoners, analyze intelligence, build and operate overseas
combat zone bases and posts, repair and service sophisticated equip-
ment, train U.S. and foreign soldiers, conduct interrogations, and per-
form many other functions.16  In the first Gulf War, the ratio of
civilian contractors to military members was 1 to 36.17  During the
conflict in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, the ratio was 1 to 10,18
and as of 2010, the ratio in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeded 1 to 1.19
Indeed, by 2015, the DoD has committed to hiring 20,000 new con-
tract-monitoring personnel just to manage the contracts governing ci-
vilian personnel.20  Candidly, when testifying before Congress in
2007, General David Petraeus noted that the U.S. military “would not
be able to function in Iraq at all without contract security
personnel.”21
B. Specific Types of Civilians
The increased use of civilian labor to support U.S. combat efforts
takes many forms.  Broadly speaking, the civilians on or near the bat-
tlefield fall into one of three categories.  They are either DoD employ-
ees, employees of private corporations that have been hired through
contract to support U.S. military efforts, or employees of another U.S.
government agency or department (e.g., the CIA or the Department of
State (DoS)).22
15. Dickinson, supra note 4, at 149–50.  This does not imply that contractor deaths
are any less deplorable, but instead reflects the sad reality that service member
deaths appear, at least anecdotally, to garner more attention and have a greater
negative political impact.
16. Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers, Private Contractors, and the Problem of
International Law Compliance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 355 (2010).
17. Maj. Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing
the Rubicon?, 51 A.F. L. REV. 111, 111 n.5 (2001).
18. Id.
19. Laura A. Dickinson, Outsourcing Covert Activities, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. LAW & POL’Y
521 (2012).
20. Id. at 531–32, 532 n.39.
21. Dickinson, supra note 16, at 357 (citing Nomination of Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus
to be General and Commander Multi-National Forces, Iraq: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Armed Services, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Lt. Gen. Petraeus),
available at http://dpc.enate.gov/dpcdoc.cfm?doc_name=OR-110-1-13#Link3).
22. Present on the battlefield are also numerous non-governmental organization
(NGO) representatives, but because their activities generally do not implicate
LOAC issues, they are not the focus of this Article.
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1. DoD Employees
The DoD directly employs more than 700,000 civilian employees,23
many of whom are deployed alongside active and reserve military
members.  The work performed by these employees ranges from low-
paid clerks in the Pentagon and military bases scattered around the
United States to highly trained scientists in research laboratories and
analysts and managers deployed overseas.  Civilian employees are es-
pecially prevalent in logistics and support-type jobs such as shipyards,
logistics centers, arsenals, and repair depots.24
Many of the DoD’s civilian employees are required, as a condition
of their employment, to be ready and willing to deploy with the Armed
Forces to combat zones and other high-risk areas.  These employees
are designated as “emergency essential” (E-E), and are required by
law to “provide immediate and continuing support for combat opera-
tions or to support maintenance and repair of combat essential sys-
tems of the armed forces.”25  Additionally, by law, the work performed
by E-E employees cannot practically be performed by military mem-
bers “because of a necessity for that duty to be performed without in-
terruption.”26  Most E-E employees that deploy to combat zones
perform logistics and engineering support roles, though some perform
jobs such as recreation specialist to help deployed soldiers find ways to
recreate and relax when off-duty.27
2. Private Military Companies/Contractors
While there are certainly still numerous DoD civilian employees
deployed with U.S. armed forces around the world, the trend has been
to replace many civilian employees with contracted civilians.28  In
2009, United States Central Command, which at the time was over-
seeing the conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, had contracts for
approximately 243,000 civilians to support the two conflicts.29  In fact,
by late 2009, security contractors outnumbered all foreign troops in
23. CAREERS IN NATIONAL DEFENSE, http://www.godefense.com (last visited Mar. 14,
2012).
24. Heaton, supra note 12, at 184–85.
25. 10 U.S.C. § 1580(a)(1) (2006).
26. 10 U.S.C. § 1580(a)(3).
27. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERA-
TIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 231 (2008) [hereinafter OPLAW Handbook].
28. See, e.g., Transforming the Department of Defense Personnel System: Finding the
Right Approach: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Reform, 108th
Cong. (2003) (statement of Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense) (noting
that due to perceived difficulties in managing civilian employees, 83% of civilians
supporting the U.S. military at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom were
contractors).
29. Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participa-
tion in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5, 8 (2010).
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Iraq (except the United States) and in Afghanistan (except the United
States and the United Kingdom).30
The U.S.’ Operational Law Handbook refers to these employees as
“Contingency Contractor Personnel” and breaks their services down
into three categories: (1) external support (those hired from outside
the theater of operation, such as TCNs, to support deployed forces); (2)
systems support (those with technical expertise hired to support key
weapons systems and communications gear); and (3) theater support
(those hired from local vendors to meet the immediate needs of opera-
tional commanders, such as fuel and transportation support).31  Ex-
amples of the services contractors provide include “communication
services, interpreters, base operations services, weapons systems
maintenance, gate and perimeter security, [and] intelligence
analysis.”32
One of the largest and most widely used contracting firms is Kel-
logg, Brown, and Root.  This firm’s employees are ubiquitous in Iraq
and Afghanistan and they “built and maintained military bases,
transported troops and equipment to and on the battlefield, repaired
and maintained roads and vehicles, distributed water and food to
troops, washed laundry, refueled equipment, attended to hazardous
materials,” and performed a myriad of other services, all to the tune of
roughly $1.7 billion annually.33
3. Specific and Controversial Employment of Civilians
Some of the tasks performed by contractors are legally benign and
do not implicate the LOAC in any meaningful way.  Others, however,
raise questions about whether the civilian is directly participating in
hostilities (DPH).  The contours of the concept of DPH and other appli-
cable legal doctrines will be addressed in Part III below.  For now, it is
worth noting some of the more controversial tasks performed by con-
tractors on or near the modern battlefield.
a. Intelligence and Information Operations
Both from this author’s personal experience in Iraq and as re-
ported in the literature, contractors are involved in the areas of mili-
tary intelligence and information warfare.34  The work performed by
contractors in these areas includes intelligence analysis and the main-
tenance of intelligence collection and analysis sensors and computer
30. Id. at 9.
31. OPLAW Handbook, supra note 27, at 240.
32. Id. at 239.
33. Dickinson, supra note 4, at 150.
34. See, e.g., Heaton, supra note 12, at 190.  Additionally, in this author’s experience
in Iraq in 2009, contractor employees were active members of the headquarters
intelligence directorate.  Further detail is not provided for classification reasons.
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systems.35  In 2009, Congress expressly banned direct intelligence
gathering by contractors,36 but contractors are still certainly involved
in the overall intelligence business.  DoD civilian employees, unlike
contractor employees, may “direct or control intelligence . . . and per-
form intelligence activities that require the exercise of substantial dis-
cretion in applying governmental authority and/or in making
decisions for the government.”37
b. Security
As has been highlighted by frequent media accounts throughout
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors are heavily involved in
security work in combat zones, both providing security on and around
military bases, as well as providing security for the U.S. DoS and vari-
ous Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).38  The number of se-
curity contractors in Iraq alone is astounding.  In 2004, an estimated
20,000 security contractors were operating in Iraq,39 and by 2008, the
number was approximately 30,000.40
According to the U.S. Army’s Operational Law Handbook, the gen-
eral U.S. policy is for contractors to only provide security services for
“other than uniquely military functions”41 and if major combat opera-
tions are ongoing, “contract security services will NOT be used to
guard U.S. or coalition military supply routes, military facilities, mili-
tary personnel, or military property except as specifically authorized
by the Combatant Commander.”42  Quite clearly, for Iraq and Afghan-
istan, the Commander of U.S. Central Command has authorized con-
35. Id. (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-695, MILITARY OPERA-
TIONS: CONTRACTORS PROVIDE VITAL SERVICES TO DEPLOYED FORCES BUT ARE NOT
ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED IN DOD PLANS (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03695.pdf).
36. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 110-84,
§ 1038 (2009).  Waivers are authorized in the interest of national security.
37. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION 1100.22, POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR DE-
TERMINING WORKFORCE MIX, encl 4, ¶ 4(b)(11) (Apr. 12, 2010).
38. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-737, REBUILDING IRAQ: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO IMPROVE USE OF PRIVATE SECURITY PROVIDERS 2005; see also, Heaton,
supra note 12, at 187 (noting security contractors provide protection for many
different military and government function in Iraq); Kirit Radia, Controversial
Blackwater Security Firm Gets Iraq Contract Extended by State Dep’t, ABCnews.
com, Sept. 1, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Blackwater/black
water-security-firm-iraq-contract-extended-state-dept/story?id=8466369#.T1ZpS
8zBp7w (discussing the extension of a contract with a private security firm to
provide transportation by helicopter around Iraq for embassy employees).
39. Heaton, supra note 12, at 187.
40. Schmitt, supra note 29, at 9.
41. OPLAW Handbook, supra note 27, at 248–49.
42. Id. at 249.
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tractors to provide security services in theater.43  These security
contractors are not authorized to engage in military actions, though
they are authorized to use force in self-defense or defense of others.44
c. Prisoner Handling and Interrogation
Though no longer authorized, until 2009, contractors were allowed
to function as interrogators of prisoners and detainees in DoD and
CIA detention facilities.45  Notably, contractors hired by the U.S. De-
partment of Interior supervised some of the military members who
abused detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq46 and the contractors
had “ ‘little, if any, training on [the] Geneva Conventions,’ and little
interrogation experience.”47  Some of these same contractors were di-
rectly implicated in the abuse of detainees.48
d. Translation
Many contractors were used as translators in Iraq and continue to
be used as translators in other areas of conflict.  While this service
does not ordinarily implicate the LOAC, it can and did where contrac-
tor translators were implicated in the Abu Ghraib abuse.49
e. Training & Advising
Contractors are used to provide both U.S. and foreign troops with
training and advice.  This training includes basic officership and sol-
diering, war-gaming, and tactical planning.50  Although in many ways
benign, some contractors performing training and advising missions
actually become involved in combat operations by either providing on-
site training during combat missions or by doing actual tactical mis-
43. In this author’s personal experience, bases throughout Iraq were guarded by a
combination of U.S. and Coalition military forces, as well as contractor security
forces—typically TCNs.
44. See, e.g., Policy Letter 11-01, Performance of Inherently Governmental and Criti-
cal Functions, 76 FED. REG. 56227, 56240 (Sept. 12, 2011) (noting that “combat”
functions are “inherently governmental functions” and thus cannot be performed
by contractors).
45. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 110-84,
§ 1038 (2009).
46. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 19; see also Won Kidane, The Status of Private
Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law, 38 DEV. J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 361, 405 (2010) (noting that private military contractors were also in-
volved in the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison).
47. Dickinson, supra note 16, at 382 (quoting Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, ARTICLE 15-6
INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY IN-
TELLIGENCE BRIGADE 51 2004, available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf).
48. Dickinson, supra note 4, at 151–52.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 150.
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sion planning.51  Contractors provide advice on how to conduct actual
combat operations to both the Iraqi and Afghani armies.52
f. DoD Drone Operations
According to the media, the U.S. Air Force is short of personnel to
operate UAVs, analyze the intelligence feeds coming from the drones,
and technicians to repair and maintain the aircraft, so civilians are
often used for critical drone operations.53  For instance, in 2010, a
DoD drone strike in Afghanistan struck the wrong target, killing a
number of innocent men, women, and children.54  The ensuing investi-
gation revealed that the UAV mission was commanded from Florida
and a contractor working for SAIC was providing the real-time intelli-
gence analysis that led to the erroneous identification of the target.55
Although uniformed members operated the drone and made the actual
decision to fire the missile in the above example, there are instances
where contractors operated the UAV during combat missions.56
4. Title 50 Employees & Para-Military Strikes
Although typically referred to obliquely or through insinuation, the
CIA and its employees appear to be deeply involved in the War on
Terror, both before and after the events of 9/11.  A number of CIA of-
ficers and employees have been killed on the battlefield,57 and count-
less others have contributed in significant ways to the protection of
Americans from further attack.  From both media reports and state-
ments by government officials, it is evident that the CIA, like the mili-
tary, is involved in conducting drone strikes and direct action raids to
kill al-Qaeda militants.58
Professor Robert Chesney is an expert on the “convergence” that
has occurred between CIA para-military forces and DoD’s special op-
erations forces, and he writes about the so-called “Title 10/Title 50”
51. Heaton, supra note 12, at 188–89.
52. Id.
53. David S. Cloud, Civilian Contractors Playing Key Roles in U.S. Drone Operations,
LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/
dec/29/world/la-fg-drones-civilians-20111230.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Maj. Lynn R. Sylmar, Warrior Civilians—Non-Military Personnel on the Battle-
field 4 (April 2009) (unpublished report submitted to faculty of Air Command and
Staff College, Air University), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?
AD=ADA538897.
57. Daniel Nasaw & Vikram Dodd, Eight Americans Killed in Afghan Blast Were CIA
Agents, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 30, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/dec/30/afghanistan-khost-civilians-killed.
58. See, e.g., Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the
Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 539, 567–72 (2012).
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debate within academia that deals with the blending of the roles of
these two parts of the Executive Branch.59  Professor Chesney de-
scribes this convergence as follows:
The military’s [Joint Special Operations Command] and the CIA’s [Counter
Terrorism Center] appear to have developed parallel counterterrorism capaci-
ties spanning: the collection, analysis, and exploitation of intelligence; non-
kinetic operations to influence events; and kinetic operations up to and includ-
ing the use of lethal force outside of combat zones.60
The current domestic legal authority for the CIA’s actions stems
from a secret presidential finding signed by President Bush just days
after 9/11.61  This order modified and expanded a similar finding
signed by President Reagan in 1986.62  President Reagan’s finding au-
thorized the CIA to take military-style action, including the use of
deadly force, when attack was imminent.63  The new post-9/11 order
“grant[ed] the agency broad authority to use deadly force against bin
Laden as well as other senior members of al-Qaeda and other terrorist
groups.”64  This revised order provided “programmatic approval”
rather than requiring the agency “to return to the President again and
again to obtain specific authorizations for particular actions”65 and
authorized detentions without criminal charge, use of proxy forces for
lethal action, and lethal drone strikes.66
As seen in reports of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, the CIA
and the military have not necessarily operated on parallel but sepa-
rate tracks in the War on Terror.  While each entity has developed its
own resident intelligence and operational capabilities to combat ter-
rorists, the two entities cooperate on missions in various settings
around the globe.67  In fact, each organization details operators to the
other and forms joint or “hybrid” tactical teams for certain missions.68
A key controversy created by the employment of CIA civilians in
this manner is the military-like lethal action being undertaken by un-
privileged civilians.  The 9/11 Commission recommended that “[l]ead
responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations,
whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department
[to be] consolidated with the capabilities . . . already being developed
59. See id.
60. Id. at 578.
61. Id. at 563.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 553–54.
64. Id. at 563 n.120 (quoting Joby Warrick, CIA Assassin Program Was Nearing New
Phase: Pannetta Pulled Plug After Training Was Proposed, WASH. POST, July 16,
2009, at A1).
65. Id. at 563.
66. Id. at 564–65.
67. Id. at 578–80.
68. Id.  These hybrid teams known as “omega” or “cross matrix” teams have operated
in at least Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen.
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in the Special Operations Command.”69  Clearly, this recommendation
was not followed.  Today, 20% of the CIA operatives that work in the
Counterterrorism Center are “targeters”70 and “[l]ike a military com-
mander, the CIA’s Director now routinely decides whether to launch
missiles to kill various targets, balancing the advantage to be gained
with the risks (including the risk of collateral damage).”71
In the past three years, the CIA has reportedly used force over 300
times in Pakistan alone, or approximately once every three days.72  At
least until the bin Laden raid, the Pakistan operations appear to have
been conducted with notice to the Pakistani government.73  However,
as one U.S. Army judge advocate notes, “[p]aramilitary operatives do
not meet any of the prerequisites necessary to be considered lawful
combatants . .  . [and] are not members of the Armed Forces and can-
not be incorporated into the force.”74  Many of the Pakistani drone op-
erations are commanded by CIA officials, but are flown by the U.S. Air
Force.75  In Yemen, drone strikes have been a combination of DoD,
CIA, and “joint” strikes (the DoD operating under CIA authority and
control).76
III. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The activities of the civilians described above raise a number of
questions in terms of the LOAC.  Before analyzing these issues, it is
necessary to first examine the relevant LOAC terms and categories
applicable to these civilians.
A. Types of People Found on the Battlefield
Of the many categories of people found on the modern battlefield,
the two classic and key categories are that of “combatant” and “civil-
ian.”77  These terms describe the necessary divide that allows the
LOAC principle of distinction to do its work and minimize the harm
69. Id. at 575–76 (quoting NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., FI-
NAL REPORT 415 (2004)).
70. Id. at 562.
71. Id. at 569.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 568.  Professor Chesney notes that in 2008, the policy appears to have
changed from prior notification of Pakistani officials, to “concurrent notification,”
meaning the Pakistanis would be informed as a mission was underway or com-
plete.  In 2009, President Obama approved the CIA request for more drones and
expanded their use dramatically.
74. Lt. Col. Mark David “Max” Maxwell, U.S. Army, The Law of War and Civilians on
the Battlefield: Are We Undermining Civilian Protections?, MILITARY REVIEW
Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 17, 20.
75. Chesney, supra note 58, at 580.
76. Id. at 570.
77. OPLAW Handbook, supra note 27, at 15–16.
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suffered by non-participants in war.  A number of other terms have
been developed to describe the various types of people found on the
modern battlefield.  All of terms are now discussed in turn.
Combatant.  Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP
I) says, “[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other
than medical personnel and chaplains . . .) are combatants” and as
such “have the right to participate directly in hostilities.”78  Combat-
ants enjoy the “combatant’s privilege,” which entitles them to carry
out attacks on enemy personnel and objects, yet not face prosecution
for those acts under the domestic legislation of the host country.79  A
combatant “[m]ay only be punished for breaches of the law of war as a
result of a fair and regular trial.”80
In order for a State’s armed forces to qualify for combatant status,
the forces must meet all four of the following conditions: “[(1)] com-
manded by a person responsible for his subordinates . . . ; [(2) wear] a
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance . . . ; [(3)] carry[ ] arms
openly . . . ; [and (4)] conduct[ ] their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.”81  If a uniformed member meets these crite-
ria and is authorized by his State to engage in warfare against an
enemy combatant, then he is “not constrained by the law of war from
applying the full range of lawful weapons against enemy combatants
and civilians taking a direct part in hostilities.”82
Armed Forces.  The armed forces of a party to a conflict, at least for
purposes of a direct participation in hostilities analysis, include “both
[the] regular armed forces and any organized armed group that be-
longs to a party.”83  A member of an armed force may be attacked at
any time, so long as they are not hors de combat.84
Civilian.  Under the LOAC, a “civilian” is defined in the negative—
it is anyone who is not a combatant.85  “In case of doubt whether a
78. International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], Protocol Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 UNTS 3, sec II, art. 43(2) (June
8, 1977), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36b4.html [here-
inafter AP I].
79. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
IN WAR 188 (2010); W. Hays Parks, Direct Participation in Hostilities: Perspec-
tives on the ICRC Interpretive Guidance: Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participa-
tion in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 778 (2010).
80. Parks, supra note 79, at 779.
81. ICRC, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third
Geneva Convention), 75 UNTS 135, Part I, art. 4(2) (Aug. 12, 1949), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36c8.html [hereinafter GC III].
82. Parks, supra note 79, at 780.
83. Schmitt, supra note 29, at 16.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 15.
2012] CIVILIANS ON THE BATTLEFIELD 473
person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.”86
Civilians, unless they meet an exception, shall never be the targets of
deliberate attack.87  If captured, civilians do not receive Prisoner of
War (POW) status, but they do receive protections under the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949.
Non-Combatant.  This is a special category of military personnel
that only includes medical personnel and chaplains.88  These individu-
als are not civilians, but neither are they combatants.  They are not
authorized to participate in combat (other than self-defense) and upon
capture, they are considered “retained persons” rather than POWs.89
They may either remain with their POW compatriots to provide their
services, or they may be released or exchanged back to their State’s
forces.90
Civilians Accompanying the Force.  This category of persons on the
battlefield has become ubiquitous and raises many complex and inter-
esting legal issues.  “Persons who accompany the armed forces” is a
category recognized and set apart for special protection in the Third
Geneva Convention,91 although the protection of this category of civil-
ian goes back to the Lieber Code.92  This category of civilian includes
technical representatives, civilian engineers, MWR employees, logisti-
cians, and so on.  These employees receive this status when they are
authorized by the DoD to accompany the military forces into a conflict
zone and are given an appropriate identification card, identifying
their status under the Geneva Conventions.93  If captured during an
armed conflict, civilians accompanying the force are entitled to POW
status.94
Organized Armed Group.  From 2003 until 2008, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) undertook to study and articulate
86. AP I, supra note 78, art. 50(1).
87. Solis, supra note 79, at 232; see also AP I, supra note 78, art. 51(“The civilian
population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers
arising from military operations.”).
88. Solis, supra note 79, at 191.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. GC III, supra note 81, art. 4(A)(4).
92. See W. Hays Parks, Evolution of Policy and Law Concerning the Role of Civilians
and Civilian Contractors Accompanying the Armed Forces, delivered at the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross’s Third Expert Meeting on the Notion of Di-
rect Participation in Hostilities, 4 (Oct. 2005) available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/
assets/files/other/2005-07-expert-paper-icrc.pdf (comparing civilians accompany-
ing the force with private civilians, i.e. those not authorized to accompany DoD
forces and not given a Geneva identification card; the latter would not have POW
status according to Mr. Parks).
93. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION 3020.41, OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT,
encl. 2, ¶ 1(a)(1) (Dec. 20, 2011).
94. Id.; see also GC III, supra note 81, art. 4(A)(4) (describing the classes of people
granted POW status).
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what it means for a civilian to “take a direct participation in hostili-
ties” for purposes of Article 51(3) of AP I.95  “Organized armed
groups,” according to the Interpretive Guidance, belong to the same
category as the armed forces of a party, so long as the group is organ-
ized, armed, and belongs to a party to the conflict.96  These individuals
are not considered to be civilians and, unlike other civilians who take
a direct part in hostilities, may be attacked at any time, not just “for
such a time” as they are directly participating.97
Two essential criteria for gaining the status of an organized armed
group, according to the Interpretive Guidance, are that the group must
tied to a belligerent party and members of the group must perform a
“continuous combat function” (CCF) in order to be attacked on the ba-
sis of membership alone.98  The CCF may be expressed
through the carrying of uniforms, distinctive signs, or certain weapons [and]
may also be identified on the basis of conclusive behaviour, for example, where
a person has repeatedly directly participated in hostilities in support of an
organized armed group in circumstances indicating that such conduct consti-
tutes a continuous function rather than a spontaneous, sporadic, or temporary
role assumed for the duration of a particular operation.99
Unprivileged Belligerent/Unprivileged Enemy Belligerent/Unlaw-
ful Combatant/Unlawful Enemy Combatant.  These are all terms
used by commentators and the U.S. Government at various times and
in various settings.  Each is similar, but carries slightly different
meanings.
First, “unprivileged belligerent” is a term historically applied to
“private citizens (other than members of a leve´e en masse)100 who en-
gage in unauthorized combatant acts.”101  This term has been used by
the United States to describe captured members of al-Qaeda and car-
ries with it a denial of both privileged combatant and POW sta-
tuses.102  By contrast, according to at least one LOAC expert, a
95. ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
under International Humanitarian Law, International Committee of the Red
Cross, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991, 991–92 (2008) [hereinafter Interpretive
Guidance].
96. Schmitt, supra note 29, at 16.
97. Id.; see also Interpretative Guidance, supra note 95, at 1007–09 (comparing civil-
ians with those considered members of an organized armed group).
98. Interpretative Guidance, supra note 95, 1007–08.
99. Id.
100. This term has been defined by the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 268 (Nov.
16, 1998) as “inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who, on the approach of the
enemy, spontaneously took up arms to resist the invading forces, without having
had time to form themselves into regular armed units, and at all times they car-
ried arms openly and respected the laws and customs of war.”
101. Parks, supra note 92, at 10.
102. Id. at 11.
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civilian accompanying the force who does take a DPH will nonetheless
retain POW status upon capture.103
Second, “unprivileged enemy belligerent” is a term defined in the
most recent MCA and means:
an individual (other than a privileged belligerent) who: (A) has engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; (B) has purpose-
fully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coa-
lition partners; or (C) was a part of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense
under [the MCA].104
This definition broadens the prior one by adding “material support”
and membership as triggers for this status.
Third, an “unlawful combatant” is defined by the ICRC as “all per-
sons taking a direct part in hostilities without being entitled to do
so.”105  As with the prior categories, an unlawful combatant is denied
POW status upon capture.106
Finally, “unlawful enemy combatant” is a term used in U.S. doc-
trine and means “persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who
engaged in acts against the United States or its coalition partners in
violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict.”107
The term specifically includes “an individual who is or was part of or
supporting Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces that are en-
gaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners.”108
The prevailing view appears to hold that these terms do not re-
present a third category of individuals on the battlefield beyond “com-
batants” and “civilians.”109  Instead, these categories are better
viewed as descriptions used by certain States (e.g., the United States)
as “shorthand expression[s] useful for describing those civilians who
take up arms without being authorized to do so by international
law.”110  The key to understanding the importance or usefulness of
103. Id.
104. 10 U.S.C. § 948A (2009).
105. Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants,” 85
INT’L REV. OF RED CROSS 45, 46 (2003).
106. See Solis, supra note 79, at 207.
107. U.S. DEP’T. OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 2310.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, encl.
2, ¶ 1.1.2 (Sept. 5, 2006).
108. Id.
109. Solis, supra note 79, at 206–08; see HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in
Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. [2005] IsrSC 57(6) 285, ¶ 28 (“It does not appear to us that we
were presented with data sufficient to allow us to say, at the present time, that
such a third category has been recognized in customary international law.”).  For
the opposing view, arguing that a third category has been created, see Mark
David Maxwell, Targeted Killing, The Law, and Terrorists: Feeling Safe?, JOINT
FORCE QUARTERLY First Quarter 2012, at 127 and Christensen, supra note 11, at
286 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942)).
110. Solis, supra note 79, at 208 (quoting Antonio Cassese, Expert Opinion on Whether
Israel’s Targeted Killings of Palestinian Terrorists is Consonant with Interna-
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these terms is the concept of “direct participation in hostilities” and its
resultant loss of protection from attack.  This term will be discussed in
the following sections of this paper.
B. Key LOAC Principles
There are many LOAC principles that govern the individuals dis-
cussed herein, but three are worthy of further discussion for purposes
of this paper.  These are the principles of distinction (also called dis-
crimination), necessity, and “direct participation in hostilities.”
1. Distinction/Discrimination
As noted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia, “The protection of civilians in time of armed conflict . . . is the
bedrock of modern humanitarian law. . . .  [I]t is now a universally
recognized principle . . . that deliberate attack on civilians or civilian
objects are absolutely prohibited by international humanitarian
law.”111  The basic rule known as distinction is found in Article 48 of
AP I and provides:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish be-
tween the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.
While the United States is not a party to AP I, this provision is widely
held to be representative of customary international law and as such
is binding on all parties, including the United States.112
The principle of distinction does its work by placing responsibilities
upon both civilians and combatants.113  Combatants are obligated to
refrain from directly targeting civilians, and civilians are obligated
“not to use his or her protected status to engage in hostile acts.”114
2. Military Necessity
If distinction resides on one half of the scale upon which State in-
terests are balanced with those of innocent bystanders, then the
LOAC principle of “military necessity” (or just “necessity”) resides on
the other half.115  Military necessity has been defined as “that princi-
tional Humanitarian Law (2006), available at http://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/
cassese.pdf).
111. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 521 (Jan. 14, 2000).
112. See Solis, supra note 79, at 252.
113. Parks, supra note 79, at 772–73.
114. Id.
115. Schmitt, supra note 29, at 6 (“IHL represents a very delicate balance between two
principles: military necessity and humanity.”).  Similarly, the Interpretive Gui-
dance, supra note 95, at 993, states: “The primary aim of IHL is to protect the
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ple which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law
which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the
enemy as soon as possible.”116  This principle is not found in the Ge-
neva Conventions or their Additional Protocols, but rather is found in
the 1907 Hague Regulation IV, Article 23(g) and is considered part of
the customary international law of war.117
3. Direct Participation in Hostilities
Central to the question of when and whether a civilian is, by his or
her actions, in violation of the LOAC or, at minimum, undermining
the United State’s legal theory on the targeting of terrorists, is the
question of when a civilian is taking a “direct part in hostilities.”118
According to Article 51(3) of AP I, “[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection
afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities.”
As seen from Part II, a greater number of civilians share the battle
space in modern conflict, and more importantly, a frequent belligerent
in the War on Terror is a non-uniformed actor.  It is evident, then,
that the work undertaken by the ICRC in producing the Interpretive
Guidance on what “direct participation in hostilities” means is an im-
portant undertaking.  The ICRC’s work is the culmination of six years
of study and deliberation, but it is not binding on States, is not cus-
tomary international law, and is not universally accepted as the cor-
rect interpretation of the LOAC.119  The Interpretive Guidance set out
to answer three key legal questions: (1) “Who is considered a civilian
for the purposes of the principle of distinction?”; (2) “What conduct
amounts to direct participation in hostilities?”; and (3) “What modali-
ties govern the loss of protection against direct attack?”120
As to the first question, the ICRC found that for purposes of inter-
national armed conflict, “all persons who are neither members of the
armed forces of a party to the conflict nor participants of a leve´e en
masse are civilians” and thus entitled to protection.121  For non-inter-
national armed conflict, “all persons who are not members of State
armed forces or organized armed groups of a party to the conflict are
victims of armed conflict and to regulate the conduct of hostilities based on a
balance between military necessity and humanity.”
116. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare ¶ 3(a) (July
18, 1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10].
117. Solis, supra note 79, at 258.
118. AP I, supra note 78, art. 51(3).
119. See Interpretative Guidance, supra note 95, at 991; Parks, supra note 79; see also
Schmitt, supra note 29 (analyzing the enforceability and breadth of the Interpre-
tative Guidance published by the ICRC).
120. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 95, at 994.
121. Id. at 995.
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civilians.”122  While relatively non-controversial and straightforward,
these definitions do become more complex when one asks who is a
member of an “organized armed group.”  The ICRC defines this latter
category as “the armed or military wing of a non-State party.”123  The
key criterion for membership in such a group, the ICRC asserts, is
“whether a person assumes a continuous function for the group involv-
ing his or her direct participation in hostilities.”124  These are individ-
uals “whose continuous function involves the preparation, execution,
or command of acts or operations amounting to direct participa-
tion”125 and are distinct from those who may have joined the group or
received some training, but after some period of active participation,
“leave the armed group and re-integrate into civilian life.”126  Those in
this latter sub-group are civilians until such time as they return to
active participation.127  The ICRC also notes that civilian employees
and contractors that accompany the force are subject to this same con-
cept—if they are given a continuous combat function by their assigned
or performed duties, they too become de facto members of the armed
force or organized armed group.128
For its part, the United States has not, to date, issued a formal and
comprehensive response to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance, but cer-
tain officials have on a few occasions made comments which elucidate
the U.S. Government’s position on certain issues discussed in the In-
terpretive Guidance.  For instance, in a speech to the American Society
of International Law in March of 2010, the Department of State Legal
Advisor, Harold Koh, remarked that
we have based our authority to detain [members of al-Qaeda and associated
terrorists] not on conclusory labels, like “enemy combatant,” but on whether
the factual record in the particular case meets the legal standard.  This in-
cludes, but is not limited to, whether an individual joined with or became part
of al-Qaeda or Taliban forces or associated forces, which can be demonstrated
by relevant evidence of formal or functional membership, which may include
an oath of loyalty, training with al-Qaeda, or taking positions with enemy
forces.129
Mr. Koh noted that the United States disagrees with the ICRC “on
some of the particulars” of the Interpretive Guidance, but states that
the United States’ approach is “consistent with” the Interpretive Gui-
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1006.
124. Id. at 1007.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1008.
127. Id.  Also included in the group of those who are not performing a continuous com-
bat function are “recruiters, trainers, financiers and propagandists.” Id.
128. Id.
129. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address before the Ameri-
can Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (transcript available at http://
www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm).
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dance.130  Regarding the lethal targeting of terrorists, Mr. Koh stated
that “individuals who are part of such an armed group are belligerents
and, therefore, lawful targets under international law.”131  It would
seem, then, that the United States perhaps adopts the analytical
framework for membership in an armed group as articulated by the
ICRC, but takes a more expansive view of what specific actions consti-
tute a CCF.  Based on the United States’ history regarding detention,
prosecution, and even targeting of those providing “material support,”
it would seem that the United States specifically disagrees with the
ICRC on whether one has to actually engage in the physical fight to be
performing a CCF.132  Professor Schmitt supports this view when he
argues “the only viable approach to membership in the direct partici-
pation context is one that characterizes all members of an organized
armed group as members of the armed forces (or as civilians continu-
ously directly participating).”133  A requirement that members actu-
ally perform a combat function, he argues, “precludes attack on
members of an organized armed group even in the face of absolute
certainty as to membership.”134  If the available evidence persuasively
suggests that a person is an active member of the armed group ac-
tively planning harm against the United States, the argument goes,
then the member’s specific role should not determine whether the
member is targetable under the LOAC.135
Next, the ICRC turned to the constitutive elements of DPH.136  Ac-
cording to the ICRC, in order to be DPH, an act must meet all three of
the following criteria:
1. the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military
capacity of a party . . . or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction
on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm);
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to
result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which
that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation); [and]
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., the apparent targeting of the cleric al-Alawki by the United States.  For
a representative news account reporting how al-Awlaki was a recruiter rather
than a combatant in the traditional sense, see Born in US, Al-Awlaki was his
birth nation’s sworn enemy, MSNBC.COM, Sept. 30, 2011, available at http://
today.msnbc.msn.com/id/44730882/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/
#.T1ojnXmyVSt.
133. Schmitt, supra note 29, at 24.
134. Id. at 23.
135. Id. at 23–24.
136. Just as in the Interpretive Guidance, supra note 95, at 994 n.4, this Article uses
the terms “direct participation in hostilities,” “taking a direct part in hostilities,”
and “directly participating in hostilities” synonymously.
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3. the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required thresh-
old of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of an-
other (belligerent nexus).137
Any assessment of these factors will be done, by necessity, on a case-
by-case basis.138
The threshold of harm element can be met in two ways.  First, the
harm may be an act of a military nature and directed against enemy
forces.139  Alternatively, the harm may consist of the infliction of
death, injury, or destruction on protected (i.e. “civilian”) persons or ob-
jects.140  In either case, the harm need not actually happen—it just
must be likely to result in an adverse effect.141
The second element, direct causation, requires that the harm be
brought about in one causal step.  Capacity-building activities are in-
direct and thus do not meet this element.142  Examples of non-qualify-
ing indirect activities include imposition of “economic sanctions,
conducting scientific research and design, producing weapons, recruit-
ing forces, and providing general logistics support.”143  This list of in-
direct activities specifically includes assembly and storage of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which, given their ubiquitous
and destructive use on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan,
proved controversial.144
Finally, the belligerent nexus requires that an act be “specifically
designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of
a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another.”145  This ele-
ment appears aimed at distinguishing between the criminal who, for
instance, steals military goods to sell them for profit, as compared to
the insurgent who steals military property to use it against the en-
emy.  To meet this element, the act must be “in support of a party to
the conflict and to the detriment of another.”146
137. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 95, at 995–96 (emphasis added).
138. See, e.g., the U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP 1-14M, § 8.2.2 (2007) (“direct participation in hostili-
ties must be judged on a case-by-case basis . . . based on the person’s behavior,
location, and attire, and other information”); see also Prosecutor v. Du, No. IT-94-
1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 616 (May 7, 1997) (noting the need to examine the
facts of each case to see if the person was actively involved in hostilities).
139. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 95, at 1016.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1017; see also Schmitt, supra note 29, at 27 (“The threshold of harm ele-
ment requires only that the act in question be likely to result in the adverse effect
in question; it need not eventuate.”).
142. Interpretative Guidance, supra note 95, at 1021.
143. Schmitt, supra note 29, at 30.
144. Id.; see also Interpretive Guidance, supra note 95, at 1022 (noting that the assem-
bly and storage of an IED may be connected with the resulting harm through an
uninterrupted chain of events, but does not directly cause the harm).
145. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 95, at 1025.
146. Id.
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In addition to the constitutive elements of DPH, the ICRC’s Inter-
pretive Guidance also discusses the temporal aspect of DPH, which is
rooted in the “for such a time as” language of Article 51(3) of AP I.
According to the Interpretive Guidance, “[m]easures preparatory to
the execution” of a specific act of DPH, as well as “deployment to and
return from” the act, constitute an integral part of the act and are
thus within the meaning of DPH.147  Thus, DPH encompasses more
than the immediate execution of the act but does not include “prepara-
tory measures aiming to establish the general capacity to carry out
unspecified hostile acts.”148  The key appears to be the specificity of
the intended act, rather than acts preparatory to actions in general.
For instance, loading bombs onto a plane for a specific bombing mis-
sion qualifies, but transporting bombs to an airfield for unspecified
future bombing runs does not.149  Similarly, if aimed at a specific act,
actions such as the transport and positioning of weapons or gathering
of intelligence may qualify as DPH under the temporal analysis, but if
not aimed at a specific, identifiable act, they do not qualify.150
Next, in the “[m]odalities governing the loss of protection” section
of the Interpretive Guidance, the ICRC opines, “the kind and degree of
force which is permissible against persons not entitled to protection
against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary to
accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circum-
stances.”151  Under this controversial aspect of the Interpretive Gui-
dance, military necessity requires not only that the target be lawful
(i.e. its destruction is indispensable for securing the complete submis-
sion of the enemy as soon as possible152), but also that the force used
not “exceed what is actually necessary.”  The ICRC suggests that this
means one may not kill an otherwise legitimate target “where there
manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.”153  In other
words, one must first try and capture the enemy.  Professor Schmitt
argues, “[No] state practice exists to support the assertion that the
principle of military necessity applies as a separate restriction that
constitutes an additional hurdle over which an attacker must pass
before mounting an attack.”154  Needless to say, this portion of the
Interpretive Guidance is particularly controversial.
Prior to the issuance of the Interpretive Guidance, and prior to the
attacks of 9/11, the United States offered the following definition of
DPH:
147. Id. at 1031.
148. Id. at 1032.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1040.
152. FM 27-10, supra note 116, ¶ 3(a).
153. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 95, at 1043–44.
154. Schmitt, supra note 29, at 41.
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[I]mmediate and actual action on the battlefield likely to cause harm to the
enemy because there is a direct and causal relationship between the activity
engaged in and the harm done to the enemy.  The phrase “direct participation
in hostilities” does not mean indirect participation in hostilities, such as gath-
ering and transmitting military information, transporting weapons, muni-
tions and other supplies, or forward deployment.155
Later, in 2006, the U.S. DoD Law of War Working Group examined
when and whether a civilian accompanying the force would lose im-
munity from intentional attack and wrote that such a person would
lose protection if there is “(1) geographic proximity of service provided
to units in contact with the enemy, (2) proximity of relationship be-
tween services provided and harm resulting to enemy, and (3) tempo-
ral relation of support to enemy contact or harm resulting to
enemy.”156
An additional source of U.S. doctrine with regard to DPH can be
found in The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Opera-
tions.157  This policy document says DPH must be “judged on a case-
by-case basis” and that “civilians serving as lookouts or guards, or in-
telligence agents for military forces may be considered to be directly
participating on hostilities.”158
Though not without dissent, experts say that a civilian taking a
DPH is not a per se violation of the LOAC.159  The DPH causes the
civilian in question to lose protection from deliberate attack, but un-
less the civilian’s actions that constitute the DPH also constitute a
war crime in the classic sense (e.g., deliberate targeting of civilians, as
many terrorists do), then the civilian is not subject to prosecution as a
war criminal for having committed a grave breach.  Of course, because
the civilian is not a privileged combatant, he or she may be subject to
prosecution under the host jurisdiction’s criminal laws against
homicide.
The Obama Administration has stopped using the term “unlawful
enemy combatant,” but has retained much of the same authority to
target and detain terrorists as that used by the prior Administra-
155. Christensen, supra note 11, at 296–97 (quoting MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING TWO OPTIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE CONVENTION
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106–37, at VII (2000)).
156. Cdr. Albert S. Janin, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Navy, Engaging Ci-
vilian-Belligerents Leads to Self-Defense/Protocol I Marriage, 2007 ARMY LAW.
82, 89 (2007) (quoting U.S. ARMY, INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY INT’L & OPERATIONAL
LAW VOL. II, I-10 (Sept. 2006) (Civilian Protections in Armed Conflict)).
157. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, NWP 1-14M (July 2007).
158. Id. § 8.2.2.
159. See, e.g., Solis, supra note 79, at 211; Parks’ Address, supra note 8.  For an oppos-
ing viewpoint, see, e.g., OPLAW Handbook, supra note 27 (noting that Contin-
gency Contracting Personnel who engage in hostilities risk being treated as
“unprivileged belligerents” and thus as war criminals).
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tion.160  The current Administration’s position suggests a membership
approach to DPH, but the limits of membership remain unclear.161
C. DoD Doctrine and Regulations Regarding Civilians
In addition to the LOAC provisions that apply to U.S. civilian em-
ployees and contractors, there are a number of DoD regulations that
also pertain.  These regulations are indicative of the United States’
policy with regard to use of civilians, but do not necessarily reflect a
U.S. reaction to or interpretation of the latest ICRC’s Interpretive Gui-
dance on DPH.
One of the primary ways U.S. regulations limit the type of work
that can be performed by contractors is through the concept of “inher-
ent governmental function.”  According to Army policy, only employees
of the United States (and in the case of combat situations, employees
of DoD, either civilian or military) may perform “[f]unctions inherent
to, or necessary for the sustainment of combat operations, that are
performed under combat conditions or in otherwise uncontrolled situ-
ations, and that require direct control by the military command struc-
ture and military training for their proper execution.”162  These
functions also include those “performed exclusively by military (active
and reserve) who are trained for combat and the use of deadly force,
where performance by a contractor or civilian would violate their non-
combatant status under the Geneva Conventions.”163
Similarly, DoD regulations say that military tasks such as “com-
mand,” “operational control,” and “combat operations” are all inher-
ently governmental and may only be performed by military
personnel.164  Likewise, “if the planned use of destructive combat ca-
pabilities is part of the mission assigned,” a military member must
perform the mission.165  Decisions to “offensively respond to hostile
acts or demonstrated hostile intentions”166 as well as operation of a
weapon system against an enemy are inherently governmental,
whereas “technical advice on the operation of weapon systems or other
support of a non-discretionary nature performed in direct support of
combat operations” is not.167
Contractors hired by the United States to support military opera-
tions are also similarly restricted.  For instance, contractors may not
160. Christensen, supra note 11, at 292.
161. Id.
162. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 715-9, CONTRACTORS ACCOMPANYING THE FORCE
21 (glossary of terms) (Oct. 29, 1999).
163. Id.
164. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION 1100.22, supra note 37.
165. Id. at encl. 4, ¶ 1(c)(2).
166. Id. at encl. 4, ¶ (d)(1)(d).
167. Id.
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“take an active role in hostilities but [do] retain their inherent right to
self-defense.”168  Contractors may, however, perform “security ser-
vices for other than uniquely military functions.”169  Whether a partic-
ular act by a contractor is permissible is “dependent on the facts and
requires legal analysis.”170  These vague standards, of course, do not
do much work in shaping the fine contours of appropriate and permis-
sible work by contractors.
The rule for U.S. contractors is summarized well by Hays Parks
when he states:
[A] civilian contractor may not engage in an action that is “inherently govern-
mental”, [sic] that is, a decision involving discretion on behalf of the govern-
ment.  Thus while a civilian contractor may operate a military unmanned
aerial vehicle in flight, he or she is not authorized to launch any ordnance
from it.  Only a member of the armed forces may take this act.171
D. Legal Authority for CIA “Direct Participation”
As a matter of domestic law, civilian employees of non-DoD depart-
ments and agencies, such as the CIA, are authorized to perform func-
tions that, arguably, are military in nature and, in any event, involve
taking lethal action against our nation’s enemies.  Professor Robert
Chesney has studied the involvement of non-DoD members in para-
military action generally and in the War on Terror in particular.  He
notes that there is “an ongoing process of convergence among military
and intelligence activities, institutions, and authorities” and this
“trend has accelerated considerably over the past decade [since 9/
11].”172
CIA authority to engage in para-military activity can be traced to
the 1947 National Security Act where the CIA was assigned a number
of functions, one of which has been colloquially called the “fifth func-
tion” (because it was number five in the list).  This fifth function al-
lows CIA operatives “to perform such other functions and duties . . . as
the National Security Council may from time to time direct.”173  In
1974, the Hughes–Ryan Amendment added two key requirements
before the CIA performs any covert activity (including para-military
activity): the presidential finding and notification to congressional
committees.174  In 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12,333, which requires all agencies engaged in covert activities to com-
168. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-100.21, CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD,
¶ 6-3 (2003) [hereinafter FM 3-100.21].
169. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION 3020.41, supra note 93.
170. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION 3020.41, CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL AUTHOR-
IZED TO ACCOMPANY THE U.S. ARMED FORCES, ¶ 6.3.5 (Oct. 3, 2005).
171. Parks’ Address, supra note 8, at 13.
172. Chesney, supra note 58, at 539–40
173. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(d), 61 Stat. 495 (1947).
174. Chesney, supra note 58, at 588–89.
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ply with the Hughes–Ryan Amendment,175 and in 1990, Congress de-
fined “covert action.”  According to U.S. law, “covert action” includes
any activity that meets three conditions: “(1) it must be conducted by
an element of the U.S. government; (2) it must be meant to ‘influence
political, economic, or military conditions abroad’; and (3) the ‘role of
the United States Government’ in sponsoring the activity must not be
intended ‘to be apparent or acknowledged publicly.’”176
The Executive has interpreted these vague phrases to allow for
overt overseas action against enemy forces by the CIA.  Over time,
through both acquiescence and legislation, Congress has agreed and
has put in place the conditions and restrictions mentioned supra.177
While Title 50 may provide the domestic statutory authority for covert
action conducted by the CIA, it does not, nor does it claim to, provide
the constitutional or international law basis for use of this power in
any particular situation.  Professor Chesney accurately observes, “Ti-
tle 50 authority does not provide carte blanche to act in violation of
international law,”178 nor does it provide “justification for disregard of
the laws of war.”179
IV. ANALYSIS
Having examined the trend of “civilianization” and the various
roles for civilians that have resulted from this trend, the legal catego-
ries of individuals present on the battlefield, and the LOAC principles
that apply, this Article now turns to the legal issues and concerns
raised by these facts.  First, criticisms, weaknesses, and alternative
approaches to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on DPH will be dis-
cussed.  Second, the legal issues raised by the convergence of military
and intelligence functions will be examined.  Third, the implications of
the U.S. law governing military commissions will be explored.  Fi-
nally, accountability and the role for military judge advocates will be
discussed.
A. Criticism of and Alternatives to the ICRC’s Interpretive
Guidance
In the War on Terror, the question of when civilians are taking a
DPH for purposes of the LOAC is a critical one.  Accordingly, the
ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance is a very useful document.  However, it
175. Id. at 591–92.
176. Id. at 593 (quoting S. 2834, 100th Cong. § 503 (1999)).  The current definition of
“covert action” and the rules regarding its use are codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413b.
177. Id. at 587.
178. Id. at 617.
179. Id. at 618.
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is one NGO’s opinion180 and it has its critics.  To date, the United
States has not issued a formal response to the Interpretive Gui-
dance.181  However, a tribunal has addressed the concept of DPH and
other experts have commented on the ICRC’s work.  A discussion of
some of the critiques and alternative approaches follows.
1. Israeli Supreme Court Approach
One of the only tribunals to have taken up the issue of civilians
taking a DPH is the Israeli Supreme Court.  In 2005, the court issued
its opinion in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Govern-
ment of Israel.182  In that case, which pre-dates the Interpretive Gui-
dance, the Court grappled with how to define DPH.  As to the
“hostilities” element of DPH, the court found that it should include
acts that are intended to damage both military and civilian objects.
Regarding the “direct part” element, the court quotes with approval
the following passage: “to restrict this concept to combat and active
military operations would be too narrow, while extending it to the en-
tire war effort would be too broad.”183  In order to discourage civilians
from participation, the court favored a broad interpretation of “direct,”
but rather than outlining a strict test for DPH, the court said it must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.184
In discussing representative examples of civilians taking a DPH,
the court did opine that DPH would include those who gather intelli-
gence on the enemy, transport combatants to the place of hostilities,
operate the weapons used by unlawful combatants (including super-
vising their operation, or even servicing the weapons), and drive am-
munition to the place of hostilities.185  The list would further include
those who planned an attack by unlawful combatants, and those who
decided upon or authorized the attack.186
Finally, as to the “for such a time as” aspect of DPH, the court
observed the lack of international consensus on how to interpret the
phrase, but noted that for “a civilian who has joined a terrorist organi-
180. While the ICRC is but one NGO’s opinion, it is nevertheless an important NGO,
and the ICRC is certainly recognized for its expertise in interpreting and apply-
ing the LOAC.
181. INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.
ARMY, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK 109 (2011).
182. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. [2005] IsrSC 57(6)
285, ¶ 33.
183. Id. ¶ 34 (quoting INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDI-
TIONAL PROTOCOLS 516 (1987)).
184. Id.; see also Christensen, supra note 11, at 302 (“When trying to find the proper
middle ground, the court favored a broad interpretation of ‘direct’ in order to en-
courage civilians to remain detached from hostilities.”).
185. HCJ 769/02, lsrSC57(6) 285, ¶ 35.
186. Id. ¶ 37.
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zation . . . the rest between hostilities is nothing other than prepara-
tion for the next hostility.”187  Thus, without stating it expressly, the
court articulates something akin to the “continuous combat function”
discussed by the ICRC and suggests that membership in a terrorist
organization is enough for DPH.
While the United States would seemingly concur with the court’s
temporal analysis by considering members of terrorist organizations
to be taking a DPH, the United States would likely find the court’s
definition of “taking a direct part” to be overbroad in that it would
include many of the functions currently performed by U.S. civilians,
be they DoD employees, CIA officers, or civilian contractors.
2. Scholarly Criticism and Alternative Approaches to DPH
One of the most compelling criticisms of the Interpretive Guidance
is espoused by Professor Schmitt when he argues that it skews the
balance between military necessity and humanity too far toward hu-
manity, thus undermining its usefulness and credibility.188  Professor
Schmitt was one of the experts who participated in the ICRC’s prepar-
atory expert panel discussions that led to the drafting of the Interpre-
tive Guidance, but due to strong disagreement with portions of the
document, he removed his name from the list of contributors.189
Professor Schmitt has a number of objections, but his three pri-
mary objections will be discussed here.  First, by differentiating be-
tween members of an organized armed group that perform a CCF and
those who do not, Schmitt argues that the Interpretive Guidance pro-
vides certain “non-state actors, who enjoy no combatant privi-
lege, . . . greater protection than [that enjoyed by] their opponents in
the regular armed forces.”190  Moreover, the legitimate military com-
batant will have a difficult time distinguishing between those who are
performing the CCF and those who are not.   The requirement of a
CCF, Schmitt argues, “precludes attack on members of an organized
armed group even in the face of absolute certainty as to member-
ship.”191  The better approach, according to Professor Schmitt, is to
consider all members of the organized armed group as members of the
armed forces and place the burden on the member to affirmatively
“opt out” or distinguish himself from the group to attain civilian
protection.192
Schmitt’s second objection is the so-called “revolving door” prob-
lem, based on the argument that the approach taken by the ICRC re-
187. Id. ¶ 39.
188. See Schmitt, supra note 29, at 6.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 44.
191. Id. at 23.
192. See id. at 24.
488 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:459
sults in “individuals who directly participate on a recurring basis
enjoy[ing] greater protection than lawful combatants.”193  The exam-
ple cited is the “farmer by day, insurgent by night,” where the farmer
is protected from attack when in farmer mode, but is subject to attack
while acting as an insurgent.194  This approach proves untenable in
the modern insurgent context where the weapon of choice is often an
IED emplaced well outside of the proximal or temporal presence of
enemy soldiers.  The insurgent is only legally exposed to attack while
emplacing the IED, or traveling to or from the emplacement site.195
However, because, by design, the insurgent is generally not trying to
make actual contact with his target, the person is rarely subject to
attack during his period of DPH.  The approach that best honors the
principle of military necessity and does not cause an imbalance be-
tween necessity and distinction is to consider the civilian who directly
participates in hostilities as one who “remains a valid military objec-
tive until he or she unambiguously opts out of hostilities through ex-
tended non-participation or an affirmative act of withdrawal.”196  The
participant, Schmitt argues, “should bear the risk associated with
misunderstanding as to status and not combatants who have been
previously attacked.”197
Finally, Professor Schmitt voices significant concern about the re-
straints the Interpretive Guidance places on the use of force.198  The
Interpretive Guidance says “the kind and degree of force which is per-
missible against persons not entitled to protection against direct at-
tack must not exceed what is actually necessary.”199  The Interpretive
Guidance seeks to use the LOAC principle of military necessity as a
two-part test—first, during target selection, the target must be milita-
rily necessary, and second, during target prosecution, the means used
to attack the target must be necessary.200  This is translated by the
ICRC as a requirement that, if possible, an individual be captured
rather than killed even where the person is a legitimate military tar-
get.  Professor Schmitt notes that no state practice supports the notion
that military necessity imposes this second restriction.201  Instead,
Schmitt argues that the “crucial issue is not whether the individual in
question can feasibly be captured but instead whether he or she has
clearly expressed his or her intention to surrender.”202
193. Id. at 44.
194. Id. at 37.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 38.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 40.
199. Id. (quoting Interpretive Guidance, supra note 95, at 77).
200. Id. at 40–41.
201. Id. at 41.
202. Id. at 42.
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Colonel W. Hays Parks, USMC (Ret.), is the former Senior Associ-
ate Deputy General Counsel in the International Affairs Division of
the DoD’s Office of General Counsel.  He is widely regarded as one of
the pre-eminent experts on the LOAC.  Colonel Parks participated in
many of the expert discussions that led to the creation of the Interpre-
tive Guidance and, as such, is well placed to critique the final product.
Parks argues that the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance, and in particular
Section IX of the report, got it wrong when it imported Pictet’s “contin-
uum of force” principles and made them a part of the equation for indi-
vidual soldiers.203  Like Professor Schmitt, Parks is concerned that
the ICRC is attempting to create an additional burden on States that
did not previously exist and is not supported by decades of modern
state practice.  The ICRC, Parks argues, uses the Israeli Supreme
Court decision as a basis for first assuming there is a gap in the LOAC
that must be filled by human rights law, and second, fills that gap
with a principle that was in many ways unique to the Israeli con-
flict.204  The requirement to capture rather than kill (if possible) im-
posed by the Israeli Court stems from the unique circumstances of the
continuous terrorist activity in the occupied territories and has its ba-
sis in domestic Israeli law.205
Military necessity, as a core principle of the LOAC, is a concept
applicable to States as they choose appropriate military targets and
objectives.  It is not a principle applicable to the tactics used by indi-
vidual combatants.206  The burden is on senior military and civilian
leadership to choose strategic and operational military objectives con-
sistent with the principle of military necessity, but there is no similar
burden on the individual soldier to decide whether the tactic used to
subdue the enemy is in compliance with military necessity.207  In-
stead, the individual soldier must be concerned with distinction and
proportionality.  In other words, the soldier must make sure that his
target is not a protected civilian and must ensure that when prosecut-
ing valid military targets, the anticipated collateral harm done to ci-
vilians is not excessive in relation to the military advantage gained.208
The soldier is not, Parks argues, obligated to use the law enforcement
use of force approach.209
Professor Geoffrey Corn also takes issue with the ICRC approach
to DPH.  Although his critique was published prior to the final publi-
203. See Parks, supra note 79, at 793.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 792–93.
206. Id. at 803.
207. Id.
208. Id.; see also Solis, supra note 79, at 250 (explaining that battlefield events can be
examined in terms of distinction, military necessity, unnecessary suffering, and
proportionality).
209. Parks, supra note 79, at 807.
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cation of the Interpretive Guidance, Professor Corn’s criticism is based
on interim reports regarding DPH published by the ICRC.  DPH as a
concept or legal principle, Corn argues, must be limited to that which
it really is—a targeting rule.210  The DPH concept is not meant to
serve as a guideline for what civilians may properly do on the battle-
field.  This approach, in some ways, is consistent with the assertion
that a civilian taking a DPH, by itself, does not constitute a war
crime.211
To determine what functions a civilian augmentee may properly
perform, one should ask, “[W]ill the exercise of discretion associated
with this function implicate LOAC compliance?”212  “If the answer is
yes,” Corn argues, then “the function must be reserved to members of
the armed forces.”213  To utilize this test, the State party seeking to
use a civilian must determine whether a particular function falls into
one of the categories regulated by the LOAC: (1) “[s]election of and
employment of methods and means of warfare”; (2) “[t]reatment of
captured and detained personnel”; (3) “[c]ollection of and care for the
enemy wounded”; and (4) “[p]rotection of civilians from the harmful
effects of war.”214  If a function falls into one of these categories, then
there is a presumption that the function should not be civilianized.215
If, however, “there [is] no reasonable probability of LOAC violation
from an abuse of [civilian] discretion, the presumption [will] be rebut-
ted and civilianization of the function permitted.”216
A third approach to DPH is that proposed by Major Michael Guil-
lory.  Major Guillory suggests that the test for civilian DPH ought to
be:
[C]ivilians may support and participate in military activities as long as they
are not integrated into combat operations.  In this context, integration is be-
coming an uninterrupted, indispensable part of an activity such that the ac-
tivity cannot function without that person’s presence and combat operations
are any military activities that are intended to disrupt enemy operations or
destroy enemy forces or installations.217
While this test was articulated prior to the ICRC’s Interpretive Gui-
dance, it is still useful in that it seeks to better define the temporal
“for such a time as” language of AP I and argues that the timeframe is
less important than the causal connection.  By contrast, the ICRC ap-
proach is to cut off liability (and thus susceptibility to attack under
210. Geoffrey S. Corn, Unarmed but How Dangerous? Civilian Augmentees, the Law of
Armed Conflict, and the Search for a More Effective Test for Permissible Civilian
Battlefield Functions, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 257, 282 (2008).
211. See, e.g., Solis, supra note 79, at 211.
212. Corn, supra note 210, at 287.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 288.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 288–89.
217. Guillory, supra note 17, at 134.
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the concept of DPH) at one step removed from the attack in the chain
of causation.
In order to adopt the test proposed by Major Guillory, the United
States would likely need to dramatically scale back the use of civilians
for front-line battlefield support functions such as intelligence analy-
sis, technical weapon maintenance and support, and certain advisory
functions.  Given the well-entrenched use of civilians over the past ten
years, it is unlikely the United States would be willing to retreat that
far from current practice, so this test is unlikely to gain much support.
B. Legal Consequences of Convergence
As discussed at length supra, there has been and continues to be a
convergence between the military and intelligence community, espe-
cially in the area of direct action against terrorists in the form of
targeted killings via UAV strikes.  Professor Chesney makes a compel-
ling case that “[t]he convergence trend has a disruptive impact on the
complex legal architecture that governs U.S. intelligence and military
activities.”218  One primary area of concern is the application, or lack
thereof, of the LOAC to CIA activities.  This author does not mean to
suggest, nor does Professor Chesney, that the CIA violates the LOAC
principles of military necessity or distinction in its targeting of ter-
rorists.219  Harold Koh, the DoS Legal Advisor, has stated, “it is the
considered view of this Administration . . . that U.S. targeting prac-
tices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned
aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including the laws of
war.”220  While it is undoubtedly true that innocent civilians have
been killed as a result of CIA-led airstrikes, these incidents are best
viewed as unfortunate examples of allowable collateral damage.  In-
stead, the LOAC concern arises from the use of CIA civilians in direct
action UAV strikes against terrorists, not in the manner in which they
conduct the direct action.
The LOAC binds the State, not just the military forces of the
State.221  Accordingly, to the extent that the LOAC allows or encour-
ages military combatants to engage in armed conflict, and disallows or
discourages civilians to do the same, use of CIA civilians runs counter
to key principles within the LOAC.  Professor Chesney states:
[T]here is no basis for setting IHL [international humanitarian law] aside
merely because of the identity or nature of the particular organization or en-
tity through which the party is acting.  Indeed, the United States could hardly
218. Chesney, supra note 58, at 583.
219. Id. at 619–20 (“[T]here is considerable reason to believe that the CIA does follow
the DoD practice of applying IHL concepts of necessity, distinction, and propor-
tionality in all settings—even those that might not amount to armed conflict.”).
220. Koh, supra note 129.
221. Chesney, supra note 58, at 618.
492 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:459
argue otherwise in the post-9/11 era, given the consistency with which it has
advanced the position that non-military actors, such as al Qaeda members,
are bound by IHL and may be prosecuted for war crimes for their IHL
violations.222
Indeed, the United States has recently taken the position that “the
AUMF [authorizing strikes against al-Qaeda] is best read to implicitly
condition its grant of authority upon compliance with applicable IHL
rules.”223  Moreover, nothing in Title 50 suggests that Congress in-
tended that the CIA or anyone else within the U.S. Government be
exempt from LOAC compliance.224
As a matter of policy, regardless of how a particular armed conflict
is characterized, the DoD applies the LOAC to all of its actions.225
The CIA does not have such a policy, at least not acknowledged pub-
licly.226  Therefore, the CIA appears to have (and take) more latitude
with regard to how its civilian employees are utilized in the War on
Terror.
The decision by the U.S. Government to use CIA assets to conduct
covert actions and UAV strikes against terrorists seems to, at least in
part, rest on the desire or need to operate in locations where the
United States does not have host-nation consent, even though consent
is not necessary if acting in self-defense.  Additionally, the military is
constrained by the precise limitations outlined in the particular Exe-
cute Orders (EXORDs) issued by the Secretary of Defense.227
The CIA, by contrast, is not so constrained, at least overtly.  It
would appear that the CIA has, or at least had, the consent of Paki-
stan to operate drones in their State, including the use of the drones
for lethal missile strikes.228  It is also possible that the CIA is, or has
been, involved in missions without the consent of the host-state, or at
least is not as constrained if host-state permission is withdrawn, par-
ticularly in situations where the host-state is unable or unwilling to
eliminate the threat to the United States.229
222. Id.
223. Id. at 619 (citing Brief for Respondents, Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63
(D.D.C. 2009) (No. 05-0763)).
224. Id.
225. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE, 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (May 9,
2006).
226. Chesney, supra note 58, at 619.
227. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the details of the applicable EX-
ORDs in the war on terror.  In any event, much of the relevant information in the
EXORDs is classified and thus not available to the public.
228. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, 3 Killed as Drone Strikes Resume in Pakistan, NYTIMES.
COM, Jan. 10, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/11/world/asia/
cia-drone-strikes-resume-in-pakistan.html.
229. See Chesney, supra note 58, at 623–25; see also Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen.,
Address at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012) (transcript
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.
html) [hereinafter Holder’s Address] (“[T]he use of force in foreign territory would
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So, while there are apparent advantages to using CIA operatives to
conduct lethal action against terrorists in States outside of Iraq or Af-
ghanistan, there is legal risk as well.  The underlying self-defense ba-
sis for the lethal action itself is, in this author’s view, solid.
Additionally, there is no suggestion that the CIA does not follow the
LOAC targeting principles in a manner similar to DoD.  However, the
mere fact that CIA officers—unprivileged non-combatants by defini-
tion—are engaged in lethal action against an enemy is inconsistent
with the LOAC and thus, problematic.
Critics of the use of drone strikes by CIA operatives, such as Mary
Ellen O’Connell, argue, “only lawful combatants have the right to use
force during an armed conflict.  Lawful combatants are the members
of a State’s regular armed forces.  CIA operatives are not members of
the U.S. armed forces.”230  Others, such as John Murphy, argue that
the LOAC does not prohibit civilians, including CIA operatives, from
participating in hostilities.231  If they do so, they are not POWs, may
be attacked as a civilian who takes a DPH, and do not enjoy combat-
ant’s immunity.  Additionally, such a participant must, in the manner
of their actions, observe the LOAC.
Notably, at least as to international armed conflict, a number of
scholars conclude, “only military aircraft, including [unmanned com-
bat aerial vehicles], are entitled to engage in attacks.”232  This sug-
gests that a CIA drone attack, at least in an international armed
conflict, is a violation of the LOAC.  This may be somewhat irrelevant
as most agree that the United States’ conflict with al-Qaeda is now
non-international in character, even if global.
In any event, whether or not the CIA operatives’ actions are a per
se violation of the LOAC, it is widely held that by taking a part in the
war against al-Qaeda, CIA operatives open themselves up to at-
tack.233  In this author’s opinion, because the United States has at its
disposal a capable military force ready and able to perform the task of
armed attack against enemy belligerents, that task should be per-
formed by uniformed combatants and not CIA officers—not because
be consistent with these international legal principles if conducted, for example,
with the consent of the nation involved—or after a determination that the nation
is unable or unwilling to deal effectively with a threat to the United States.”).
230. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan, 2004-2009 7 (Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 09-43, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144.
231. John E. Murphy, Mission Impossible? International Law and the Changing Char-
acter of War, 87 INT’L LAW STUDIES 13, 14 (2011).
232. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON INTER-
NATIONAL LAWS APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE, 11, Rule 17(a) (2009),
available at http://ihlresearch.org/amw/HPCR%20Manual.pdf.
233. See Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo, Use of Unmanned Systems to Combat Terrorism, 87
INT’L LAW STUDIES 217, 252 (2011).
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the CIA operatives violate the LOAC, but because we consider the ob-
jects of attack to be civilians taking a DPH and subject to attack.  Be-
cause the United States rightly applies a LOAC paradigm to describe
the enemy and neutralize the threat, we ought to use uniformed com-
batants to apply force.234
C. 2009 MCA
No analysis of the United States’ use of civilians on the battlefield
would be complete without an analysis of the way the United States
subjects terrorists to criminal jurisdiction under the 2009 MCA.235
The MCA says that “any alien unprivileged enemy belligerent” is sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of a military commission when he or she com-
mits an act forbidden by the statute.236  One of the acts specifically
covered by the MCA is “murder of protected persons.”237  This provi-
sion subjects any unprivileged enemy belligerent “who intentionally
kills one or more protected persons”238 or “who intentionally causes
serious bodily injury to one or more persons, including privileged bel-
ligerents” to the MCA.239  These provisions of U.S. law were used to
prosecute Omar Khadr, the so-called “child soldier” who was captured
in Afghanistan after he took part in a firefight between terrorist in-
surgents and U.S. military personnel.  Khadr pleaded guilty to taking
up arms and fighting U.S. military forces.  In his stipulation of fact in
support of his guilty plea, Khadr admitted that he was an un-
privileged enemy belligerent and that he knew he was fighting a U.S.
service member.240
By defining Khadr’s actions as a crime and prosecuting him under
the MCA, the United States has taken the position that a civilian who
takes a DPH and in so doing, kills or wounds a privileged combatant,
has committed a crime, and arguably a war crime.  This position
would seem to place in legal jeopardy those U.S. civilians who, also
lacking a privileged combatant status, take similar actions against
others, including those terrorists we consider to be unlawful enemy
belligerents.  For instance, if other States were to adopt a similar stat-
234. I would recommend either having the CIA task the USAF or other military Ser-
vice with the actual strike or detailing military members to the CIA in their Title
10 capacity to perform the strike mission.  While the provision of intelligence to
DoD may also implicate the DPH regime, at least civilian intelligence is a well-
entrenched and widely accepted practice by numerous States.
235. 10 U.S.C. § 948a–950v (2009).
236. 10 U.S.C. § 948d.
237. 10 U.S.C. § 950T.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Stipulation of Facts, United States v. Omar Khadr, No. 07-001 (C.M.C.R. Oct. 10,
2010), available at http://media.thestar.topscms.com/acrobat/58/bf/c615afaa4bc7b
36425db6ed2f488.pdf.
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ute, a CIA officer who directs a drone strike on an al-Qaeda operative
would have violated the law.
Professor Gary Solis and others argue that a civilian taking a DPH
is not, in and of itself, a war crime.241  Instead, it is the specific action
taken by the civilian, and against whom, that determines whether a
grave breach of the LOAC has occurred.242  By using the military com-
missions process—a process generally believed to be reserved for pros-
ecution of war crimes—to prosecute civilians who attack privileged
combatants, the United States is undermining its position that its own
civilians’ role in the targeting of legitimate targets is legally
unproblematic.
D. Role of Judge Advocates
As an active-duty judge advocate, this author knows from personal
experience how heavily involved military judge advocates are in how
the United States trains for and engages in warfare.  Judge advocates
are trained in the LOAC and are expected to, and do, transmit their
expertise to the direct war fighters through training and through on-
scene, real-time advice.
Professor Laura Dickinson observes that the U.S. military has “a
tradition of inculcating international humanitarian law norms
throughout its ranks.”243  This tradition is fostered through a “culture
of obedience, loyalty, and honor”244 that comes from a distinct hierar-
chical structure.  This structure, Dickinson argues, “ensures that in-
ternal sanctions have a good deal of force, because those lower down
the chain of the command constantly seek the approval of those higher
up the chain and must submit to their authority.”245  While a strict
hierarchy may sometimes stifle useful dissent, “it is designed to en-
hance compliance with the norms that are widely accepted throughout
the chain of command.”246
Military lawyers play a part in fostering this culture of conformity
to LOAC norms because they are integrated and earn the trust of
soldiers and commanders.247  In short, “ ‘the lawyers sit in the room’
when the combat decisions are made.”248  In addition to the inherent
hierarchy of the military and the integration of military lawyers, the
judge advocate also promotes compliance with international law be-
cause he or she, generally speaking, possesses “strong commitments to
241. Solis, supra note 79, at 211.
242. Id.
243. Dickinson, supra note 4, at 209.
244. Id. at 208.
245. Id. at 209.
246. Id.
247. Dickinson, supra note 16, at 364.
248. Id.
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core values” and “can invoke an internal sanctions regime.”249  Be-
cause judge advocates are both owners and operators of the military
disciplinary system of judicial and non-judicial punishment, they can
help commanders bring appropriate and effective pressure to bear,
thus helping ensure LOAC compliance.
By contrast, Dickinson notes that civilian contractors “largely fall
outside this organizational accountability framework.”250  Many con-
tractors are former military, and as such, have some knowledge of and
perhaps some internalization of the culture of conformity to LOAC
norms, but their current operating structure only shares this culture
and structure tangentially.  In any event, the civilian is, by and large,
governed by the terms of their contract and is under the supervision of
a contracting officer, which is vastly different than being a member of
the military and directly subject to its disciplinary system and
hierarchy.251
To best deal with the civilianization of modern U.S. military opera-
tions, Professor Dickinson suggests that judge advocates play a
greater role in the training and advising of civilians.252  Alternatively,
Dickinson argues that contracting firms should “institute processes
that would help establish the organizational or professional culture
necessary to protect public values . . . [and] create internal organiza-
tional structures to enhance compliance with [LOAC] norms.”253
Whether the judge advocate continues to focus his or her practice
on advising military commanders only, or whether a broader role is
mandated that allows for greater influence on the actions of contrac-
tors, the military judge advocate must continue to not only know the
LOAC and be able to translate and transmit its principles effectively,
he or she must also understand the value that the norms carry and
effectively communicate that value to decision makers.
E. Recommendations
Based on the foregoing, the United States would be well served by
adopting the following four recommendations.  In so doing, the United
States will not only continue to be a world leader in terms of respect
for human life and honorable behavior on the battlefield, but will also
maintain a logically consistent approach to status and susceptibility
to attack.  It seems beyond doubt that international law struggles to
keep pace with the ever-changing nature of technology and warfare, so
to the extent that the United States and other nations actively in-
249. Dickinson, supra note 19, at 534 .
250. Dickinson, supra note 247, at 373.
251. See generally id. at 374–87.
252. Dickinson, supra note 19, at 527.
253. Dickinson, supra note 247, at 387.
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volved in combating terrorism create state practice that will lead to
customary international law, it is critical that we get it right.
1. Respond to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance
First, the United States should make clear its position on the vari-
ous principles and theories set forth in the ICRC’s Interpretive Gui-
dance.  Although the Interpretive Guidance notes that it is not
representative of customary international law, the well-earned repu-
tation of the ICRC, combined with adoption or assent of many States
over time, could easily turn the Interpretive Guidance into just that.
By going “on the record” as disagreeing with certain portions of the
Interpretive Guidance on certain points, the United States will make
its views clear and will bolster its contemporaneous state practice.
2. Membership Approach to DPH
Next, the United States should adopt, articulate as policy, and im-
plement the approach to targeting espoused by Professor Schmitt.  In
particular, the United States should consider all members of an organ-
ized armed group to be members of the armed force of that party, or in
the case of those deemed through reliable intelligence to be active
members of al-Qaeda, consider them to be performing a continuous
combat function and thus, directly participating in hostilities at all
times.  In so doing, the United States would consider such members to
be valid targets, even if unlawful belligerents, until such time as they
unambiguously opt out.
This approach more fairly balances the competing principles of dis-
tinction and military necessity that are skewed too heavily toward dis-
tinction by the ICRC.  This approach also limits the untenable
requirement to capture if feasible, a principle that has never been a
part of the LOAC.
3. Functional Discretion Test for U.S. Civilians
Third, the United States should apply Professor Corn’s “functional
discretion test” when assigning roles to the various types of civilians
that work on or near the modern battlefield, including those who may
operate UAVs from the United States.  If the function assigned to the
civilian will require a discretionary decision that has the potential to
implicate a fundamental LOAC principle, then a traditional, lawful
combatant—a uniformed member of the military—should perform the
function.  While this approach may require a scaling back of the
civilianization trend, it is nonetheless worth it if it allows America to
maintain the moral high ground in terms of how we engage in
warfare.
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On a related note, the United States must strongly consider how
its treatment of captured terrorists under the MCA might undermine
this approach.  It appears inconsistent for the United States to, on the
one hand, take criminal jurisdiction over and prosecute a civilian for
attacking a privileged combatant like a U.S. soldier, while on the
other hand, allow our civilians to take direct lethal action against en-
emy belligerents.  It is one thing to hold terrorists criminally liable for
their attacks that violate the LOAC, but quite another to charge them
with killing a soldier.  If they are unprivileged noncombatants, then
clearly our CIA officers and contractors are unprivileged noncomba-
tants, and if the mere DPH is not a war crime for U.S. civilians, then
neither should it be for members of al-Qaeda.
4. Legal Advice for Civilians
Finally, the United States should promote better accountability of
its civilians accompanying the force by encouraging contractors to ei-
ther create a legal advisor structure functionally similar to the Armed
Services’ judge advocate general’s corps, or require more utilization of
judge advocate services by contractors.  Professor Dickinson notes that
the U.S. military has “distinctive institutional cultures that can im-
pose strong internal sanctions for wrongdoing”254 and a “hierarchical
structure . . . designed to enhance compliance with the norms that are
widely accepted throughout the chain of command.”255  Judge advo-
cates, she argues, are a key component as they are not only steeped
and conversant in the language and culture of the military, but also
operate in close proximity to those who make LOAC-implicating deci-
sions on the battlefield.256  As a result, to the extent possible, the
same approach should be taken with regard to the many civilians that
now operate on the battlefield.  By working to infuse their sub-culture
with the same values, processes, and access to informed legal advice,
we may be better able to ensure LOAC compliance by civilians accom-
panying the force or making LOAC-implicating decisions (if, in fact,
we continue to allow this).
V. CONCLUSION
At the outset of this Article, the questions were posed whether the
use of civilians by the United States violates the LOAC or, at mini-
mum, undermines the United States’ position with regard to its cate-
gorization and treatment of al-Qaeda terrorists.   Because of the real
and meaningful differences between how al-Qaeda conducts hostilities
and how the United States does so, the answer to the first question is
254. Dickinson, supra note 4, at 207.
255. Id. at 209.
256. Dickinson, supra note 16, at 364.
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“no.”  The United States does not violate the LOAC by how it employs
civilian employees and contractors on the battlefield.  Instead, the
United States fastidiously goes to great lengths to honor and comply
with the LOAC.
However, as to the second question, U.S. practices do run the risk
of blurring certain lines and undermining the credibility of the United
States in terms of maintaining the important distinction between ci-
vilian and combatant.  Indeed, many of the uses of civilians described
herein do, in fact, result in the loss of protection from targeting of
those civilians under the LOAC.  Whether the United States uses the
definitions proffered by the ICRC, or adopts one or more of the alter-
native approaches suggested by the LOAC scholars, it is clear that
some U.S. civilian activities are going to cross the line into DPH.
The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance is an important step toward
modernizing the LOAC for the twenty-first century.  Without doubt,
the methods and means of modern warfare have changed dramatically
since the 1940s when many of the LOAC principles were codified in
treaty.  The Interpretive Guidance attempts to balance the key LOAC
principles of necessity and distinction, but as Professor Schmitt and
others persuasively argue, the effort falls short in some respects.  No
sovereign nation, and in particular the United States, is going to agree
to or follow principles that, in its view, unnecessarily hamper its abil-
ity to defend its populace.  The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance tips the
scales too far in the direction of distinction by narrowly defining who
is taking a DPH and thus, unnecessarily hampers the ability of victim-
states, like the United States, to counter imminent threats of terrorist
attack.
The United States will likely continue its state practice of using a
more broad definition of those eligible for capture or attack under in-
ternational law.  However, as other authors have noted, there is a risk
of taking inherently contradictory positions.  For instance, the United
States might, on the one hand, wish to adopt a narrow definition of
DPH in order to protect its own civilians accompanying the force, but
at the same time utilize a broad definition of DPH when attacking or
prosecuting enemy belligerents.257
Similarly, the prosecution of enemy belligerents by military com-
mission for, among other things, using lethal force against an enemy
uniformed combatant, runs the risk of creating a mixed message.  Spe-
cifically, the United States asserts it is per se unlawful for an enemy
257. See discussion of the 2009 MCA supra section IV.C; Christensen, supra note 11,
at 298 (“[The United States] has incentives to pursue two seemingly contradic-
tory interpretations of DPH.  On the one hand, the United States could pursue a
narrow interpretation to protect the military’s civilian employees and contrac-
tors.  On the other hand, the United States could pursue a broad interpretation in
order to attack terrorists.”).
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civilian to take up arms against a lawful combatant, but it is not un-
lawful for a U.S. civilian to take up arms against an enemy belliger-
ent.258  There remains a very important moral distinction: the United
States deliberately targets those who, either through current action,
or through membership in al-Qaeda, pose a direct threat to the United
States, whereas the enemy deliberately targets innocent civilians.
Nonetheless, we are a nation bound by the rule of law, and therefore
legal distinctions matter.  So long as we are able to successfully defend
ourselves, we should do all that is within our power to preserve the
rule of law and maintain a consistent position or message with regard
to who may, or may not, properly engage in warfare.
The United States should draw and maintain clear distinctions be-
tween its service member combatants and its civilian support person-
nel.  Using the broad definitions of DPH as discussed supra, the
United States should honor those definitions by ensuring that its civil-
ian employees and contractors do not, themselves, directly participate
in hostilities.  While instances of DPH on the part of civilians by the
United States are not per se LOAC violations, they nonetheless
weaken the necessary LOAC wall between civilian and combatant and
provide critics with support for the argument that the United States
exhibits a limited respect for international law.
The use of CIA operatives in the War on Terror is not likely to
abate.  As numerous U.S. government officials have stated, we are “at
war” with terrorists and the United States will continue to use every
means at its disposal in the prosecution of this war.259  In this au-
thor’s view, however, there is a better path.  The United States can
still bring to bear all of the vast resources of the U.S. Government,
including the CIA, but can insist that only military members apply the
ultimate application of lethal force.260  DPH is clearly more broad
than simply “pulling the trigger,” so this proposal does not necessarily
obviate the risk that other activities engaged in by the CIA or other
civilians are, themselves, also DPH.  However, reserving the distinct
act of applying lethal force to uniformed members of the military will
serve the important purpose of showing that the United States
reserves the most extreme, overt form of direct participation to those
in uniform.  Some may say this is form over substance, but appear-
ance matters, particularly when the United States is often setting the
tone in the conduct of modern warfare, and the world is watching.
258. See, e.g., Maxwell, supra note 74, at 24–25 (“[T]he U.S. is willing to intentionally
violate the principle of distinction (its use of CIA paramilitary operatives in mili-
tary operations), yet concurrently, complain bitterly when another state violates
this same principle . . . .  [T]he presumption of status for many civilians accompa-
nying U.S. forces under international law might be negated, if not reversed, by
the intentional violation by the U.S. of the principle of distinction.”).
259. Holder’s Address, supra note 229.
260. Id.
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One of the defining and most beneficial aspects of modern democ-
racies is their state monopoly on the use of lethal force.  Generally
speaking, the United States, like other industrialized democracies,
limits the official, sanctioned use of deadly force to the judicial system,
law enforcement, and the military.  This state monopoly on the use of
lethal force does not eliminate murder, but murder is investigated and
punished and there does not exist widespread use of vigilante justice
or extra-judicial killings.  The United States does not rely on tribal
justice or gang warfare to mete out justice or control the population.
Because of this feature of our democracy, we can employ lethal force in
ways and at times of our choosing, all according to the rule of law.
Accordingly, to more fully and perfectly respect the LOAC built up
over the past 150 years, the United States should insist that in the
“war” on terror, where the use of deadly force is concerned, uniformed
service members should apply the force.  While some may label this as
overly idealistic, idealism is precisely the point.  The rule of law, and
in particular, the LOAC, is all about ideals.  These ideals, and espe-
cially the ideal of distinguishing between combatants and civilians,
have dramatically reduced the suffering and carnage imposed on civil-
ian populations over the last 150 years.  War is still horrific and inevi-
tably leads to death, but limiting the application of this force by and
against combatants helps to minimize the carnage and make war ar-
guably more humane.
We now return to the opening hypothetical . . .  Applying Professor
Corn’s functional discretion test, the UAV technician would not exer-
cise discretion that implicates LOAC principles, nor would the MWR
employee.  However, the intelligence analyst that provides targeting
advice to the commander, even if through a military member, may in
fact be making decisions that directly implicate the LOAC principles
of distinction and proportionality.  Therefore, the intelligence analyst
is taking a DPH.  Similarly, if the drone strike is a CIA operation, the
CIA officers would certainly be exercising discretionary functions that
directly implicate the LOAC.  Additionally, if the enemy were to apply
a MCA-type legal regime to U.S. civilian actions, then the CIA officers,
the UAV technical support contractor, and the intelligence analyst
would likely all be guilty of taking a direct part in the killing of either
a protected person or a privileged combatant, all while acting as an
unprivileged belligerent.
By changing how it employs civilians in the War on Terror, the
United States can continue to comply with and remain a leading
champion of the LOAC, while at the same time maintain a more con-
sistent approach to civilian participation in war, regardless of whose
side they are on.  As a world leader, we owe nothing less.
